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Abstract
　After remarkable changes in the global economy in the last two decades, does the natural 
resource curse still exist ? To answer this question, this paper examines the relationship 
between economic growth and natural resource abundance with World Bank data over the 
period 1970―2009. The results suggest that the natural resource curse still exists after the 
1990s; however, it is weaker compared with the ﬁndings of Sachs and Warner （1997） over 
the period 1970―1990. Our results are robust even when we include post-Soviet countries in 
the sample and introduce new institutional quality indicators into the model.
Keywords : Economic growth, natural resources, institutions （JEL O43, O47, Q33）
１．Introduction
　A country with abundant natural resources tends to have better opportunities for eco-
nomic growth. However, when economists examined carefully the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and natural resource abundance, they found the opposite : countries with 
abundant natural resources tend to grow more slowly than those with limited natural re-
sources. The negative interaction between economic growth and natural resource abun-
dance, which is called the “natural resource curse”, is roughly illustrated by Figure 1. Re-
source rich countries like Honduras, Gambia, Gabon, Ghana, Zambia, Guyana, Malawi, and 
Venezuela obviously have a serious problem with the “natural resource curse”.
　The seminal and inﬂuential study by Sachs and Warner （1997） with data from 95 
countries during the period 1970―1990 illustrates a signiﬁcant negative correlation between 
natural resource abundance, measured by the share of exports of primary products in 
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gross national product （further ― SXP） in 1970 and economic growth, measured by avera-
ge gross domestic product （GDP） growth rate divided by the economically active popula-
tion （GEA） in the period 1970―1990. This phenomenon is conﬁrmed by Lederman and Ma-
loney （2002）, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik （2006b）, Davis （2011） and many other 
researchers
1）
.
　Later, Sachs and Warner （2001） examined the natural resource curse by using geo-
graphical and climate variables and again found a strong negative correlation. Therefore, 
the geography variables generally do not eliminate the evidence for the existence of the 
natural resource curse. Wright and Czelusta （2003） reject the existence of the natural re-
source curse and argue that resource-based development depends on investment in explo-
ration and extraction processes. Therefore, appropriate investment in technological progress 
should be a reasonable factor in fostering the economic development in resource rich eco-
nomies. To extend the studies on the resource curse Mehlum, Moene and Torvik （2006a） 
used the same data and method as Sachs and Warner （1997）, but focused on the eﬀect of 
institutional quality. They derived and tested an equation for the institutional threshold and 
found that the resource curse is weaker in countries where the institutional quality is 
higher. This result implied that the quality of institutions is a key factor that determines 
whether a country can avoid the resource curse or not.
　Nevertheless, even if the natural resource abundance is narrowly deﬁned as a curse for 
economic growth, it may still lead to improvements in other aspects of economic develop-
ment, such as, the decline of human poverty, reduction of population that are undernouri-
shed, and a decrease in underweight children and life expectancy at birth. Bulte, Deacon 
and Damania （2004） examined the impact of natural resources on undernourishment, po-
verty, and other human development indicators, and found the same signiﬁcant negative 
（　　）
Figure 1. Economic growth and natural resource abundance during the period 1970―1990
Source : Sachs and Warner （1997）
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correlation between natural resources and economic development through the channels of 
institutional quality.
　This paper conducts an examination of the natural resource curse with World Bank data 
that includes 157 countries and covers the period 1970―2009.
　First, we try to answer the following question : does the natural resource curse still exist 
after the 1990s ? In the last two decades, the world economy has experienced dramatic 
changes such as a revolution in IT technology, growing importance of emerging markets, 
rising prices of oil and other natural resources. Hence, a re-examination of the natural re-
source curse with data in recent years is required. In this paper, we test the Sachs and 
Warner model （1997） with World Bank data and show that the correlation between natu-
ral resources and economic growth after the 1990s is still negative, but weaker.
　Second, we carry out an empirical test that includes post-Soviet collapse countries in the 
sample. By using the same model of Sachs and Warner （1997） and the World Bank data, 
we show that there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth even after 1995.
　Third, we make a further examination of the eﬀect of institutional quality on the natural 
resource curse. Poor institutionalquality usually means government ineﬀectiveness, corrup-
tion, rent-seeking, conﬂicts, unstable ﬁnancial system among other factors. Sachs and War-
ner （1997） and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik （2006a） used the rule of law index as an indi-
cator of institutional quality and found that it had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the natural 
resource curse. In this paper, we use two additional variables related to institutional quali-
ty, government eﬀectiveness index and the index of voice and accountability. Data from all 
the three variables were taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The results 
show that after controlling for the eﬀect of institutional quality, there is still a signiﬁcant 
negative correlation between natural resources and economic growth.
　The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the existence of the 
natural resource curse after the 1990s with World Bank data. Section 3 tests the model 
with post-Soviet countries included. Section 4 focuses on the eﬀect of institutional quality 
on the natural resource curse. And Section 5 concludes the ﬁndings.
２．An examination of the Natural resource curse with World Bank Data
２.１.　Model and Data
　The inﬂuential studies by Sachs and Warner （1997, 2001） examined the existence of the 
natural resource curse with a cross-country dataset over the period of 1970―1990 and found 
a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the natural resource abundance and economic 
growth. The objective of this paper is to extend their studies and examine the existence of 
the resource curse post-1990s. During the last two decades the global economy experienced 
many remarkable changes and many economists characterized this period as a transitional 
period leading to new technologies, free market competition, trade openness, and economic 
（　　）
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reforms.
　In this paper we use the Sachs and Warner model （1997）, which is presented below : 
　　　GEA7090＝ a0＋a1＊LGDPEA70＋a2＊SXP70＋a3＊SOPEN＋a4＊LINV7089＋ ⑴　　 
＋a5＊RL82＋a6＊DTT7090＋e
where,
　　　GEA7090  average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active 
population during the years 1970―1990 ;
　　　LGDPEA70  natural log of real GDP divided by the economically active population 
in 1970 ;
　　　SXP70  share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970 ;
　　　SOPEN  the fraction of years during the period 1970―1990 in which the country 
is rated as an open economy ;
　　　LINV7089  natural log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment （public＋pri-
vate） to real GDP, average over the period 1970―1989 ;
　　　RL82  rule of law index that “reﬂects the degree to which the citizens of a 
country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and 
implement laws and adjudicate disputes” ;
　　　DTT7090  average annual growth rate in the log of the external terms of trade 
between 1970―1990.
　The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per economically-active population ; 
and among the explanatory variables SXP is denoted as an indicator of natural resource 
abundance
2）
. Another important independent variable is RL, the rule of law index, which is 
deﬁned as the indicator of institutional quality of the country.
　In this study, we, ﬁrst, test the Sachs and Warner model （1997） for the last two de-
cades. This test uses the same sample as Sachs and Warner （1997）, whose dataset is cur-
rently available in the database for the Centre for International Development of Harvard 
University
3）
. The ﬁrst column in Table 1 shows the initial Sachs and Warner results （1997） 
over the period of 1970―1990. The results report that there is strong negative correlation 
between the natural resource abundance and economic growth. This negative relationship 
between growth pace and natural resource abundance is well illustrated in the following 
Figure 2. The second column ― Regression 1 ― presents results for the next two decades 
and indicates a weaker negative relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth.
　Sachs and Warner （1997） use diﬀerent sources of data, such as the World Bank data-
base （CD-ROM, 1995, World Bank） and Penn World Tables of the Center for International 
Comparisons of the University of Pennsylvania, International Country Risk Guide of the Po-
litical Risk Services. To test the robustness of the natural resource curse phenomenon and 
to equalize all data sources, we use the World Bank data （CD-ROM, 2010, World Bank）, 
the same sample of countries and the same period as Sachs and Warner （1997）. Macroeco-
（　　）
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nomic data for all variables is available inthe World Bank database. The results are shown 
in Table 2.
　Regression 4 and Regression 5 in Table 3 were conducted to examine the existence of 
the natural resource curse after the 1990s. We obtain the variable of trade openness in this 
test as being the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. This is in contrast to Sachs 
and Warner （1995） who deﬁned this variable as a dummy variable equal to 1 for open 
economy, and equal to 0 in otherwise. Sachs and Warner （1997） used cross-country dataset 
of 95 developing countries during the 1970―1990, excep. 8 slow-growing oil-exporting econo-
mies such as Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates, because of lack of complete data. In this test we expanded the number of coun-
tries from 95 to 119 countries, which are corresponds to the 1990. Hence, Regression 4 in 
Table 3 corresponds to the 95 countries in the sample of Sachs and Warner （1997）, while 
Regression 5 conducts an examination for the whole of the World Bank countries, which 
are related to the 119 number of countries.
　The Regressions in Table 5 focuses on the countries post-Soviet collapse after 1995. This 
is because after the Collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world map was re-organized 
and new countries added. These countries started to build up their states based on the 
abundance of national wealth and resources. In this test we again use World Bank data. 
Therefore, in Table 5 in Section 3 empirical results of the examination of the natural re-
source curse after the Collapse of Soviet Union are presented. The Regression 6 in Table 5 
illustrates the sample of countries which are related to 1995. The Regression 7 presents re-
sults for the 95 countries published in Sachs and Warner （1997） and the Regression 8 
presents the results of the 119 countries, which refer to 1990.
　Finally, we examine the impact of institutional quality on the natural resource curse. 
Sachs and Warner （1997） used the rule of law index as a proxy for the institutional quali-
ty. This indicator was constructed by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal 
Sector and was available from the International Country Risk Guide. Scores range from 
approximately 0 （lowest） to 6 （highest） in value. To investigate the reliability of the im-
pact of the institutions on the natural resource curse, in this test we use two new addi-
tional factors of institutional quality the government eﬀectiveness index and voice and ac-
countability index from “The Worldwide Governance Indicators” of World Bank data 
source
4）
. The score of these indices vary from -2.5 （weak） to 2.5 （strong）. Table 6 in Sec-
tion 4 presents the empirical results of the Sachs and Warner model （1997） with new fac-
（　　）
Figure 2. The natural resources and economic growth over the period 1970―1990
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tors of institutional quality. Regression 9 in the ﬁrst column of Table 6 reexamines Regres-
sion 5 to compare the results for the same sample of 119 countries. Regression 10 examines 
the impact of the institutions, based on the same sample of countries as Regression 8, but 
after 1995. Finally, Regression 11, which is similar to Regression 6, teststhe model for 157 
countries after 1995 （See Appendix A for the complete list of all countries）.
２.２.　A test of the Sachs and Warner Model in 1970―2009
　As mentioned above, Sachs and Warner （1997） discovered the phenomenon of the natu-
ral resource curse over the period 1970―1990. Post-1990 the world has experienced signiﬁ-
cant structural changes and reforms which have drastically altered economic and political 
regimes in many countries. Therefore, the goal of this Section is to extend the examination 
of the existence of the natural resource curse from post-1990 ― until 2009. In doing so, 
ﬁrst, we use the Sachs and Warner model （1997） with the sample including the exact 
same 95 counties as Sachs and Warner.
　The ﬁrst column in Table 1 below replicates the Sachs and Warner results （1997）, while 
the second column examines model the period 1970―2009. The model of Regression 1 is 
speciﬁed as below :
　　　GEA7009＝ a0＋a1＊LGDPEA70＋a2＊SXP70＋a3＊SOPEN＋a4＊LINV7008＋ ⑵　　 
＋a5＊RL82＋a6＊DTT7009＋e
　In this test, we investigated variables of economic growth, investment and growth rate 
in external terms of trade for the period 1970―2009. SXP was taken as 1970, the same as 
Sachs and Warner （1997）. RL82 is the rule of law index in 1982. SOPEN is constructed by 
（　　）
Table 1. The test of Sachs and Warner model of 1970―1990 and 1970―2009
Regression SW
1970―1990
Regression 1
1970―2009
Dependent variable GEA 7090 GEA7009
Independent variables:
LGDPEA 70 （Initial income level）  －1.79＊＊
（－8.82）
 －0.48＊
（－2.09）
SXP 70 （Natural Resources） －10.26＊＊
（－6.89）
 －3.90＊
（－2.24）
SOPEN （Openness） 　 1.34＊＊
　（3.44）
　 0.69
　（1.19）
LINV （Investment） 　 0.81＊
　（2.63）
　 1.33＊＊
　（2.79）
RL 82 （Rule of law index） 　 0.40＊＊
　（3.94）
　 0.26
　（1.70）
DTT （Growth in terms of Trade） 　 0.09
　（1.85）
　 0.15
　（1.52）
Adjusted R2 　 0.73 　 0.32
Standard error 　 0.92 　 1.38
Total number of countries 　95 　95
Number of adjusted countries 　71 　71
Notes : T-stat in brackets ; ＊signiﬁcant at the 10％ level, ＊＊signiﬁcant at the 5％ level.
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Sachs and Warner （1995）. Other variables were calculated by using the same estimation 
as Sachs and Warner （1997） for the extended period.
　The result of Regression 1 indicates that the interaction term between SXP 70 and GEA 
7009 is still negative, but it is weaker. SOPEN and RL82 are insigniﬁcant in results of Re-
gression 1 and show contrast to the results of Sachs and Warner （1997）. LINV is still posi-
tive and signiﬁcant over the time.
２.３.　An examination of the Sachs and Warner model with World Bank Data
　In order to verify the Sachs and Warner （1997） model with the World Bank data, we 
assumed that the results would not have a strong divergence from the choice of another 
data source. Sachs and Warner （1997） used the Penn World Tables and the World Bank 
database as a major data source. The World Bank data are commonly used by researchers 
and various economic studies, because of their availability and reliability. Therefore, an exa-
mination of the existence of the natural resource curse in this paper covers more countries 
than Sachs and Warner （1997）.
　Table 2 overleaf reports the results of the Sachs and Warner （1997） model with World 
Bank data. Among the variables, in Regression 2 and Regression 3 we use the same SO-
PEN and SXP, and the same DTT in Regression 2, as Sachs and Warner （1997）. This is 
because SXP is taken for 1970, SOPEN is constructed by Sachs and Warner （1995）, and 
DTT is taken for the same period of 1970―1990 with World Bank data. LINV is a gross 
capital formation （percentage share of GDP）. RL is a Government Indicator Index of rule 
of law in 2000.
　Regression 2 in Table 2 focuses on the same sample of countries and same period as 
Sachs and Warner （1997）, but this examination uses World Bank data. The results of our 
examination conﬁrm Sachs and Warner`s （1997） conclusion of the existence of the na tural 
resource curse.
　However, Regression 3 in the second column of Table 2 uses the data of 89 countries in 
the estimation, the same adjusted sample of countries as in Regression 2. The results of 
Regression 3 show a signiﬁcantly negative linkage between resource abundance and eco-
nomic growth. Yet, only LINV in this test was found to have had a positive and signiﬁcant 
impact on economic growth. The coeﬃcient of LINV in Regression 2 and Regression 3 was 
larger than of the results of the Regressionsin Table 1.
　Our examination with the World Bank data had shown the negative and signiﬁcant ef-
fect of natural resources on economic growth over time. That is, even when we extended 
the period of examination until 2009, the natural resource curse still existed. As shown in 
previous results in Table 1, both Regressions in Table 2 demonstrated signiﬁcant and posi-
tive eﬀects of LINV, while LGDPEA70 did not show any signiﬁcant link with economic 
growth.
　Figure 3 below also illustrates the existence of the natural resource curse during the pe-
riod 1970―2009 with World Bank data.
（　　）
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２.４.　Does the Sachs and Warner results withstand for the next two decades ?
　After the 1990s the process of globalization hastened its steps ; however, its eﬀect is com-
plex. In the 1970s, there were 31 countries with 11.1 percent of the world having zero or 
minus growth in per capita income. In the 1990s the number of such countries had risen 
to 48 and their combined population up to 22.5 percentof the world. Concurrently, the pro-
portion of the population in countries, where per capita income growth exceeded 4 percent 
per year, went up from 12.3 percent in the 1970s to 28.7 percent in the 1990s. In the de-
veloping world, a small group of countries has increased their share of exports from 26.3 
percent in 1970 to 66.7 percent in 2000. This group of countries has attracted the vast 
majority of foreign investments, and then they beneﬁted more from globalization.
　Due to the great changes in the global economy, whether the natural resource curse still 
exists cannot be deﬁnitively argued.
（　　）
Table 2. An examination of Sachs and Warner Model with World Bank Data
Regression 2
1970―1990
Regression 3
1970―2009
Dependent variable GEA 7090 GEA7009
Independent variables :
LGDPEA 70 （Initial income level） 　0.003
 （0.06）
 －0.008
（－0.19）
SXP 70 （Natural Resources）  －4.70＊＊
（－3.74）
 －3.05＊＊
（－2.98）
SOPEN （Openness） 　 2.19＊＊
　（3.12）
 　0.66
　（1.06）
LINV （Investment） 　 4.23＊＊
　（5.94）
　 4.78＊＊
　（6.54）
RL 96 （Rule of law index）  －0.20
（－0.66）
　 0.06
　（0.19）
DTT （Growth in terms of Trade）  －0.04
（－0.65）
 －0.02
（－0.21）
Adjusted R2 　 0.54 　 0.51
Standard error 　 1.59 　 1.29
Total number of countries 　95 　89
Number of adjusted countries 　89 　81
Notes : T-stat in brackets ; ＊signiﬁcant at the 10％ level, ＊＊signiﬁcant at the 5％ level.
Figure 3. The natural resources and economic growth over the period 1970―2009
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　Regression 4 and Regression 5 examine the natural resource curse during the period 
1990―2009. The model of this examination is as below :
　　　GEA9009＝ a0＋a1＊LGDPEA90＋a2＊SXP90＋a3＊SOPEN＋a4＊LINV9008＋ ⑶　　 
＋a5＊RL00＋a6＊DTT9009＋e
　LGDPEA and SXP in previous tests were calculated for 1970, in 1990 LGDPEA and SXP 
have diﬀerent values although insigniﬁcant in amount
5）
. Other variables were calculated over 
the period 1990―2009, except that RL is taken for 2000 ― the year in the middle of this pe-
riod. In contrast to the Sachs and Warner （1997） deﬁnition, we deﬁne SOPEN as the sum 
of exports and imports over GDP. DTT is the ratio between export and import value indi-
ces over the period 1990―2009. The results of Regression 4 and Regression 5 are shown in 
Table 3 below.
　Regression 4 examines the 95 countries which are in the sample of Sachs and Warner 
（1997）. The correlation between SXP 90 and GEA 9009 is positive, but insigniﬁcant （1.38）, 
which is totally diﬀerent from the results of Sachs and Warner （1997）. In this test only 
LINV has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient （4.49）. The outcome of this regression indi-
cates that the natural resource curse disappears after the 1990s in 95 countries of Sachs 
and Warner （1997）.
　In Regression 5 we tested the model with a greater number of countries. The correlation 
between SXP 90 and GEA 9009 is negative, but insigniﬁcant （－0.48）. Figure 4 below de-
monstrates this weak natural resource curse after the 1990s. The eﬀect of LINV on eco-
nomic growth is still strong and positive （5.32）. RL is negative and signiﬁcant （－0.34）.
（　　）
Table 3. An examination of the Sachs and Warner model for the period 1990―2009
Regression 4
1990―2009
Regression 5
1990―2009
Dependent variable GEA 9009
Independent variables :
LGDPEA 90 （Initial income level）  　0.008
　（0.19）
　 0.02
　（0.33）
SXP 90 （Natural Resources）  　1.38
　（0.88）
 －0.48
（－0.37）
SOPEN （Openness）  －0.47
（－1.40）
 －0.02
（－0.06）
LINV （Investment） 　 4.49＊＊
　（6.48）
　 5.32＊＊
　（8.74）
RL 00 （Rule of law index）  －0.04
（－0.21）
 －0.34＊
（－2.05）
DTT （Growth in terms of Trade） 　 0.11
　（1.36）
　 0.06
　（1.26）
Adjusted R2 　 0.42 　 0.45
Standard error 　 1.44 　 1.65
Total number of countries 　95  119
Number of adjusted countries 　81  119
Notes : T-stat in brackets ; ＊signiﬁcant at the 10％ level, ＊＊signiﬁcant at the 5％ level.
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　The results of Regression 4 and Regression 5 suggest that the natural resource curse 
generally does not exist in the period 1990―2009. However, the selection of sample coun-
tries may have an important eﬀect on the results. Therefore, in the next Section we 
include the post-Soviet collapse countries to extend the sample number.
３．The Natural Resource Curse after the Collapse of Soviet Union
　Many post-Soviet collapse countries have abundant natural resources and have received 
more attention in recent years. During 1991―1995 the post-Soviet countries became indepen-
dent, built their own state, received international recognition, joined of international organi-
zations, established a contractual relationship with each other, and established ﬁnancial, 
economic, ﬁscal, tax, customs and border authorities.
　Table 4 below reports the initial date of stabilization of post-Soviet and nearby European 
states, and their leaders, who conducted these eﬀorts.
　Some economists examined the natural resource curse among these countries. Kronen-
berg （2004） show that the natural resource curse still exist in transitional countries, which 
are have also high corruption levels and alow degree of education. Franke, Gawrich and 
Alakbarov （2009） examine two post-Soviet countries with strong political regimes, Kazakh-
stan and Azerbaijan, which have an abundance of oil and gas resources, howeverhave poor 
economic performances. They conclude that the natural resource curse in these states was 
induced by autocratic presidential regimes. Pomfret （2012） focuses on the resource ma-
nagement of seven resource-rich Asian transition economies : Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. Pomfret points out that re-
source-rich transition economies have to eliminate barriers to beneﬁt from resource 
abundance through promptly exploiting resource endowments with better state manage-
ment. Egert （2012） examines the eﬀect of Dutch disease in the post-Soviet countries and 
show that a clear sign of Dutch disease is obvious in resource rich post-Soviet economies : 
high exchange rate and large revenues from the natural resources.
　In this Section we include post-Soviet collapse countries in the sample and re-examine 
the natural resource curse in the period 1990―2009 based on the following model :
（　　）
Figure 4. The natural resources and economic growth over the period 1990―2009
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　　　GEA9509＝ a0＋a1＊LGDPEA95＋a2＊SXP95＋a3＊SOPEN＋a4＊LINV9508＋ ⑷　　 
＋a5＊RL09＋a6＊DTT9509＋e
　The coeﬃcients of LGDPEA 95 and SXP 95 were calculated for 1995
6）
. RL was taken for 
2009. Other variables were calculated for the period 1995―2009. The deﬁnition of SOPEN 
and DTT is the same as in Table 3. The results of the test are shown in Table 5 below.
　In Regression 6 the correlation between SXP 95 and GEA 9509 is negative and signiﬁ-
cant （－3.73）. Hence, with post-Soviet countries included in the sample ; the evidence of 
the natural resource curse is strong. Figure 5 below illustrates the relationship between 
SXP 95 and GEA 9509. The impact of LINV on GEA 9509 （5.92） is still robust and the 
coeﬃcient of LINV （5.92） is higher than those in previous tests. However, RL 09 shows 
negative and signiﬁcant correlation with GEA 9509, which indicates that poor institutional 
quality has negative eﬀects on economic growth.
　Regression 7 examines the 95 countries in the sample of Sachs and Warner countries 
（　　）
Table 4. The politics of stabilization of post-Soviet and nearby European states
Country Most serious
stabilization eﬀort
Executive who
conducted it
Albania  8/92 Meksi
Armenia 12/94 Ter-Petrossian
Azerbaijan  1/95 Aliev
Belarus 11/94 Lukashenko
Bulgaria  2/91 Popov
Croatia 11/93 Tudjman
Czech Republic  1/91 Klaus
Estonia  6/92 Vahi
FYR Makedonia  1/94 Crvenkovski
Georgia  9/94 Shevardnadze
Hungary  3/90 Nemeth
Kazakhstan  1/94 Nazarbaev
Kyrgyz Republic  5/93 Akaev
Latvia  6/92 Godmanis
Lithuania  6/92 Abisala
Moldova  9/93 Snegur
Poland  1/90 Mazowiecki
Romania  9/93 Vacariou
Russia  1/95 Yeltsin
Slovak Republic  1/91 Klaus
Slovenia  2/92 Peterle
Tajikistan  2/95 Rkhmonov
Ukraine 11/94 Kuchma
Uzbekistan 11/94 Karimov
Source : European Bank for Reconstruction and Development （1999）.
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（1997）. The coeﬃcient of SXP 95 is negative, but insigniﬁcant （－1.22）.
　Regression 8 examines the 119 countries that are included in the sample of countries of 
Regression 5. The results show that the natural resource curse exists, but it is weaker.
　In summary, when post-Soviet countries are included in the sample, the natural resource 
curse still exists and it is robust in the period 1995―2009. This resultis consistent with 
many existing studies of post-Soviet collapse countries.
４．The Natural Resource Curse and Institutional Quality
　The eﬀect of the quality of institutions on economic growth has been discussed by many 
papers. For example, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik （2006b） investigate the relationship 
between the natural resource curse and institutional quality, based on the model of Sachs 
（　　）
Table 5. An examination of the Sachs and Warner model after the collapse of Soviet Union
Reg. 6
1995―2009
Reg. 7
1995―2009
Reg. 8
1995―2009
Dependent variable GEA 9509
Independent variables:
LGDPEA 95 （Initial income level）  －0.06
（－1.06）
 －0.03
（－0.63）
 －0.03
（－0.51）
SXP 95 （Natural Resources）  －3.73＊＊
（－2.69）
 －1.22
（－1.01）
 －2.52
（－1.86）
SOPEN （Openness） 　 0.37
　（0.97）
 －0.45
（－1.44）
　 0.08
　（0.22）
LINV （Investment） 　 5.92＊＊
　（8.67）
　 4.04＊＊
　（6.00）
　 5.71＊＊
　（8.38）
RL 09 （Rule of law index）  －0.59＊＊
（－3.29）
 －0.07
（－0.39）
 －0.46＊
（－2.46）
DTT （Growth in terms of Trade） 　 0.10＊
　（2.14）
　 0.07
　（1.18）
　 0.04
　（0.67）
Adjusted R2 　 0.42 　 0.33 　 0.43
Standard error 　 2.08 　 1.42 　 1.89
Total number of countries  157 　95 　119
Number of adjusted countries  157 　85 　119
Notes : T-stat in brackets ; ＊signiﬁcant at the 10％ level, ＊＊signiﬁcant at the 5％
Figure 5. The natural resources and economic growth over the period 1995―2009
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and Warner （1997）. Ploeg （2011） examines a variety of hypothesis related to the resource 
curse. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik （2006b） and Ploeg （2011） conclude that institutional 
quality is crucial for countries to avoid the natural resource curse. Sachs and Warner 
（1997）, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik （2006a）, Bulte, Deacon and Damania （2004） also 
attained similar results ; they pointed out that countries with good institutional quality have 
eﬀective management of economic growth, trade openness, good environment and invest-
ment. In contrast, countries with low institutional quality tend tosuﬀer from rent-seeking, 
corruption, weak legislative framework, shady dealings, crime, civil wars, among other 
instances.
　Sachs and Warner （1997） use the rule of law index from the International Country Risk 
Guide, published by the Political Risk Service of the Center for Institutional Reform and 
the Informal Sector. The score ranges from 0 （lowest） to 6 （highest）. Bulte, Deacon and 
Damania （2004） use three variables to determine institutional quality ― the rule of law 
index, the voice and accountability index and the index of government eﬀectiveness, which 
were taken from the data of Kaufmann, Aart and Mastruzzi （2003）.
　In this Section, except for the index of rule of law, we also include two variables as a 
proxy variable of institutional quality-the voice and accountability index and the index of 
government eﬀectiveness. In contrast to the Sachs and Warner test （1997）, we take these 
indices from “The Worldwide Governance Indicators” of the World Bank database, which 
range from approximately -2.5 （weak） to 2.5 （strong） in value.
　Regression 9 and Regression 10 do not include the post-Soviet collapse countries. These 
Regressions examine the sample of the same 119 countries as in Regression 5 and Regres-
sion 8, respectively. Regression 11 includes the post-Soviet collapse countries and, hence, 
tests the 157 countries, which are in the sample of Regression 6.
　Thus, Regression 9 examines the period 1990―2009 by the following model :
　　　GEA9009＝ a0＋a1＊LGDPEA90＋a2＊SXP90＋a3＊SOPEN＋ ⑸　　 
＋a4＊LINV9008＋a5＊RL00＋a6＊GE00＋a7＊VA00＋a8＊DTT9009＋e
Regression 10 and Regression 11 focus on period 1995―2009 based on the model presented 
below :
　　　GEA9509＝ a0＋a1＊LGDPEA95＋a2＊SXP95＋a3＊SOPEN＋ ⑹　　 
＋a4＊LINV9508＋a5＊RL09＋a6＊GE09＋a7＊VA09＋a8＊DTT9509＋e
　Table 6 presents the results of these regressions.
　In Regression 9 the coeﬃcient of SXP 90 is negative, but statistically insigniﬁcant. This 
result is similar to SXP 90 in Regression 5. The coeﬃcients of RL 09, GE 09 and VA 09 
are also negative, but insigniﬁcant.
　In Regression 10 the coeﬃcient of SXP 95 is negative and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of 
RL 09 is positive, but insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients of GE 09 and VA 09 are negative, but 
insigniﬁcant. These results are diﬀerent from the results of Regression 8, where the SXP is 
insigniﬁcant, but the RL is statistically signiﬁcant.
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　Finally, in Regression 11 the coeﬃcient of SXP 95 is negative and strongly signiﬁcant. 
All three coeﬃcients of institutional quality, RL 09, GE 09 and VA 09, demonstrate insigniﬁ-
cant impact on GEA 9509. However, in Regression 6 the coeﬃcient of RL 09 is strongly 
signiﬁcant.
　In general, adding the indices of GE 09 and VA 09 into the model have little eﬀect on 
the results. The evidence for the existence of the natural resource curse after the 1990s 
still remains strong. The quality of institutions is generally important for the abundance of 
natural resources to be a curse or a blessing. However, how to explicitly illustrate the rela-
tionship between the natural resource curse and institutional quality remains a question 
and will be the topic for future research.
５．Conclusion
　This paper examines the relationship between economic growth and the natural resource 
abundance with World Bank data over the period 1970―2009. The results suggest that the 
natural resource curse still exists after the 1990s ; however, it is weaker compared with the 
ﬁndings of Sachs and Warner （1997） over the period 1970―1990. Our results are robust 
even when we include post-Soviet countries in the sample and introduce new institutional 
（　　）
Table 6. An examination of the Sachs and Warner Model with new factors of institutional quality
Reg. 9
1990―2009
（same as Reg. 5）
Reg. 10
1995―2009
（same as Reg. 8）
Reg. 11
1995―2009
（same as Reg. 6）
Dependent variable GEA 9009 GEA 9509
Independent variables:
LGDPEA （Initial income level）  －0.02
　（0.35）
 －0.02
（－0.47）
 －0.05
（－0.89）
SXP （Natural Resources）  －0.53
（－0.41）
 －2.73＊
（－2.02）
 －3.93＊＊
（－2.85）
SOPEN （Openness）  －0.03
（－0.09）
　 0.08
　（0.19）
　 0.31
　（0.81）
LINV （Investment） 　 5.26＊＊
　（8.45）
　 5.66＊＊
　（8.29）
　 5.84＊＊
　（8.58）
RL 09 （Rule of law index）  －0.16
（－0.34）
　 0.41
　（0.72）
　 0.36
　（0.78）
GE 09 （Government eﬀectiveness）  －0.04
（－0.09）
 －0.69
（－1.19）
 －0.76
（－1.59）
VA 09 （Voice and Accountability）  －0.17
（－0.58）
 －0.30
（－1.02）
 －0.33
（－1.17）
DTT （Growth in terms of Trade） 　 0.06
　（1.19）
　 0.04
　（0.69）
　 0.12＊
　（2.42）
Adjusted R2 　 0.44 　 0.44 　 0.43
Standard error 　 1.66 　 1.88 　 2.06
Total number of countries  119  119  157
Number of adjusted countries  119  119  157
Notes : T-stat in brackets ; ＊signiﬁcant at the 10％ level, ＊＊signiﬁcant at the 5％
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quality indicators into the model.
Notes
1）　Lederman and Maloney （2002） examine the Sachs and Warner model （1997） in period of 
1820―1989, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik （2006b） test the Sachs and Warner model （1997） with 
the derived threshold level of institutional quality. Davis （2011） statistically attempted to repli-
cate the Sachs and Warner model （1997） to conﬁrm the robustness of the natural resource 
curse.
2）　This measure implies the indicator of density of the primary explored resources of the count-
ry, since they are controversial to determine resource wealth among countries based on the 
availability of knowledge of the presence of natural resource endowments.
3）　http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
4）　Bulte, Deacon and Damania （2004） deﬁnes the government eﬀectiveness index as a measure 
of the quality of the civil service and bureaucratic eﬃciency, and voice and accountability index 
as index, which is constructed from various indicators that capture the extent to which citizens 
participate in the selection of government and the freedom of the press.
5）　See Appendix A.
6）　See Appendix A.
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APPENDIX A. Dataset and list of countries for the years of 1970, 1990 and 1995
COUNTRY
Sachs andWarner World Bank Data
1970 1970 1990 1995
LGDPEA SXP LGDPEA SXP LGDPEA SXP LGDPEA SXP
Albania 10.94 0.00
Algeria 8.25 0.19 8.05 0.19 8.41 0.21 8.37 0.25
Angola 4.49 0.48 4.10 0.00
Argentina 9.09 0.05 8.32 0.05 8.09 0.06 8.36 0.05
Armenia 11.70 0.00
Australia 9.75 0.10 9.77 0.10 10.15 0.10 10.21 0.10
Austria 9.41 0.04 9.01 0.04
Azerbaijan 5.59 0.00
Bahamas 9.44 0.00 9.36 0.05
Bangladesh 7.83 0.01 8.76 0.01 8.79 0.01 8.93 0.01
Barbados 7.36 0.17 7.86 0.07 7.83 0.05
Belarus 12.98 0.00
Belgium 9.49 0.11 9.07 0.11 9.68 0.00
Belize 7.85 0.32 8.01 0.24
Benin 10.89 0.08 10.85 0.00 10.91 0.20
Bhutan 9.34 0.00 9.59 0.00
Bolivia 8.04 0.18 7.19 0.18 7.16 0.19 7.24 0.14
Bosn. & Herz. 6.14 0.00
Botswana 6.43 0.05 8.24 0.00 8.36 0.00
Brazil 8.41 0.05 7.59 0.05 8.22 0.03 8.33 0.03
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Brunei Darussalam 9.92 0.63 9.97 0.00
Bulgaria 7.78 0.00
Burkina Faso 10.89 0.04 11.00 0.00 11.07 0.11
Burundi 9.19 0.10 9.39 0.00 9.15 0.10
Cambodia 12.99 0.00
Cameroon 7.29 0.18 12.07 0.18 12.4 0.17 12.18 0.19
Canada 9.70 0.10 9.51 0.10 10.01 0.08 10.03 0.11
Cape Verde 9.52 0.00 9.66 0.00
Cent. Africa 11.85 0.09 11.56 0.00 11.49 0.09
Chad 11.20 0.08 10.92 0.00 10.86 0.00
Chile 8.77 0.15 13.53 0.15 14.01 0.25 14.34 0.20
China 6.35 0.02 7.67 0.05 8.19 0.03
Colombia 8.33 0.09 14.58 0.09 15.18 0.13 15.31 0.07
Comoros 11.28 0.00 11.24 0.04
Congo, Dem. －16.61 0.15 －17.12 0.00 －17.70 0.00
Congo, Rep. 10.9 0.08 11.41 0.00 11.32 0.93
Costa Rica 8.65 0.19 11.58 0.19 12.01 0.13 12.18 0.21
Cote d'Ivoire 12.58 0.29 12.32 0.00 12.26 0.35
Croatia 10.00 0.05
Cyprus 9.02 0.07
Czech Republic 11.80 0.06
Denmark 9.62 0.10 11.47 0.10 11.90 0.10 12.00 0.09
Djibouti 10.99 0.00
Dominican 8.04 0.13 8.59 0.13 9.19 0.00 9.36 0.05
Ecuador 8.16 0.11 6.17 0.11 6.61 0.29 6.67 0.21
Egypt 7.67 0.07 6.40 0.07 7.16 0.05 7.27 0.03
El Salvador 8.18 0.16 6.28 0.16 6.18 0.08 6.44 0.11
Equatorial Guinea 12.34 0.00 12.44 0.00
Eritrea 6.19 0.00
Estonia 10.39 0.15
Ethiopia 6.17 0.05
Fiji 7.97 0.24 8.06 0.00
Finland 9.41 0.07 9.02 0.07 9.57 0.05
France 9.60 0.03 9.06 0.03
Gabon 13.39 0.33 13.62 0.00 13.61 0.00
Gambia 6.88 0.36 6.85 0.00 6.80 0.03
Germany 9.60 0.02 9.06 0.02 9.65 0.02 9.71 0.02
Ghana 7.62 0.21 6.04 0.21 5.78 0.00 5.87 0.00
Greece 8.80 0.04 8.60 0.04 9.05 0.04
Grenada 8.76 0.10 8.78 0.07
Guatemala 8.28 0.11 8.49 0.11 8.62 0.12 8.71 0.11
Guinea 12.53 0.00 12.45 0.15
Guinea-Bissau 11.84 0.00 11.89 0.10
Guyana 11.82 0.51 11.84 0.00 12.18 0.00
Honduras 7.81 0.23 8.79 0.23 9.00 0.30 9.06 0.44
Hong Kong 8.94 0.03 10.12 0.03 11.49 0.05 11.68 0.05
Hungary 13.83 0.09
Iceland 14.31 0.24 14.27 0.23
India 7.27 0.02 8.79 0.02 9.23 0.02 9.41 0.02
Indonesia 7.18 0.11 13.86 0.11 14.91 0.15 15.25 0.11
Iran 9.16 0.12 14.69 0.12 14.54 0.00 14.68 0.00
Ireland 9.07 0.15 8.59 0.15 9.30 0.14 9.54 0.16
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Israel 9.21 0.04 10.14 0.04 10.75 0.02
Italy 9.37 0.02 8.93 0.02 9.56 0.02 9.61 0.02
Jamaica 8.63 0.14 11.4 0.14 11.53 0.09 11.71 0.07
Japan 9.27 0.01 14.01 0.01 14.67 0.00 14.73 0.00
Jordan 7.93 0.09 6.25 0.14 6.42 0.14
Kazakhstan 11.43 0.16
Kenya 7.11 0.18 9.28 0.18 9.73 0.09 9.70 0.16
Korea, Rep. 8.03 0.02 14.16 0.02 15.65 0.02 16.00 0.02
Kyrgyz Rep. 7.60 0.15
Lao PDR 11.26 0.00 11.43 0.00
Latvia 6.85 0.10
Lebanon 14.79 0.00 15.25 0.00
Lesotho 6.64 0.00 6.76 0.00
Lithuania 8.81 0.15
Macao, China 11.54 0.01 11.72 0.01
Macedonia 10.96 0.11
Madagascar 10.18 0.12 9.81 0.09 9.64 0.14
Malawi 6.76 0.21 6.26 0.21 6.35 0.22 6.46 0.28
Malaysia 7.72 0.37 8.67 0.32 9.02 0.21
Maldives 9.48 0.17
Mali 10.54 0.08 10.52 0.15 10.54 0.00
Malta 8.75 0.00
Mauritania 11.04 0.41 10.81 0.00 10.85 0.36
Mauritius 11.05 0.15 11.25 0.11
Mexico 8.99 0.02 10.48 0.09 10.51 0.06
Moldova 7.27 0.33
Mongolia 13.09 0.00
Morocco 7.93 0.11 8.30 0.11 8.86 0.08 8.85 0.11
Mozambique 7.53 0.00 7.59 0.07
Nepal 8.91 0.01 9.04 0.01
Netherlands 9.60 0.15 9.21 0.15 9.70 0.16 9.77 0.16
New Zealand 9.66 0.18 9.85 0.17 9.93 0.16
Nicaragua 8.47 0.19 8.40 0.19 7.78 0.31 7.79 0.13
Niger 11.21 0.05 10.73 0.00 10.60 0.15
Nigeria 7.32 0.14
Norway 9.46 0.10 11.48 0.10 12.13 0.20 12.28 0.19
Oman 6.42 0.89 6.91 0.46 7.12 0.39
Pakistan 7.62 0.03 9.00 0.03 9.41 0.03 9.51 0.02
Panama 7.45 0.05 7.64 0.07
P. New Guinea 6.54 0.34 6.85 0.00
Paraguay 7.93 0.10 13.55 0.10 14.21 0.16 14.29 0.09
Peru 8.56 0.15 7.82 0.15 7.69 0.10 7.89 0.09
Philippines 7.90 0.13 9.83 0.13 10.1 0.06 10.12 0.05
Poland 9.32 0.05
Portugal 8.58 0.05 8.14 0.05 8.90 0.04 8.99 0.03
Puerto Rico 7.25 0.00
Romania 8.84 0.05
Russia 10.32 0.00
Rwanda 10.44 0.11 10.5 0.00 10.31 0.00
Saudi Arabia 9.49 0.60 9.70 0.33 9.74 0.31
Senegal 7.67 0.14 12.24 0.14 12.03 0.11 12.01 0.00
Sierra Leone 9.66 0.09
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Singapore 8.56 0.03 8.44 0.03 9.89 0.38 10.14 0.19
Slovak Republic 8.31 0.06
Slovenia 8.82 0.04
Solomon Islands 8.21 0.00 8.50 0.00
Somalia 8.98 0.09
South Africa 9.72 0.17 9.79 0.00 9.77 0.05
Spain 9.15 0.03 8.65 0.03 9.22 0.03 9.30 0.03
Sri Lanka 7.73 0.15 9.83 0.15 10.45 0.10 10.70 0.00
St. Lucia 8.85 0.25 8.96 0.14
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 8.48 0.00 8.59 0.14
Sudan 7.34 0.16 5.10 0.16 5.11 0.00 5.25 0.04
Suriname 1.78 0.31 1.71 0.22
Swaziland 8.41 0.00 8.46 0.00
Sweden 9.71 0.05 11.58 0.05 11.91 0.04 11.90 0.04
Switzerland 9.89 0.02 10.59 0.02 10.54 0.02
Syriya 8.5 0.08 9.50 0.08 10.03 0.23 10.33 0.25
Tajikistan 5.09 0.00
Tanzania 11.79 0.00 11.73 0.00
Taiwan 8.25 0.02
Thailand 8.01 0.09 8.81 0.09 10.01 0.10 10.41 0.09
Togo 7.06 0.19 10.41 0.19 10.35 0.15 10.27 0.28
Tonga 7.32 0.07 7.48 0.08
Trin. & Tobago 9.45 0.08 9.65 0.08 9.83 0.31 9.91 0.29
Tunisia 7.97 0.10 5.90 0.10 6.63 0.09 6.77 0.07
Turkey 8.30 0.04 5.74 0.04 6.33 0.03 6.44 0.03
Turkmenistan 7.01 0.00
Uganda 7.16 0.27 11.91 0.00 12.08 0.08
Ukraine 8.01 0.00
U. A. Emirates 11.94 0.00 11.92 0.00
United Kingdom 9.52 0.03 8.72 0.03 9.19 0.03 9.25 0.04
United States 9.95 0.01 9.33 0.01 9.95 0.02 10.01 0.02
Uruguay 8.78 0.09 10.83 0.09 11.01 0.11 11.17 0.07
Uzbekistan 10.01 0.00
Vanuatu 11.61 0.10 11.65 0.00
Venezuela 9.62 0.24 7.04 0.24 6.89 0.34 6.98 0.22
Vietnam 13.94 0.00 14.28 0.00
Yemen 8.46 0.00 8.53 0.53
Zambia 7.68 0.54 12.33 0.54 11.94 0.00 11.75 0.30
Zimbabwe 7.72 0.17 5.98 0.17 6.07 0.14 6.05 0.20
TOTAL :
SW 1970 WB 1970 WB 1990 WB 1995
71 countries 89 countries 119 countries 157 countries
Note : ⒜ The number of adjusted countries with LGDPEA and SXP valuesis 157, 119, 89 and 71 for the years of 1995, 1990, 
1970 and Sachs and Warner year 1970, respectively. ⒝ The sample of countries for the 1970 uses same 95 Sachs and 
Warner countries, so after adjusting there are 89 countries, based on World Bank data and 71 countries, based on 
Sachs and Warner data sources. ⒞ The variables are : LGDPEA ― the log of GDP per head of the economically active 
population in 1995 and SXP ― the share of primary exports in GNP in 1995.
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